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11 Introduction
Demand analysis has never been more important for policy analysis, where it is the key ingre-
dient for a number of policy relevant issues, such as the structure of optimal taxation, or the
analysis of demand for the study of industrial organisation and competition policy and indeed
of labour supply. However, it has now long been observed that the standard unitary model
often leads to estimated demand functions that are problematic. One key reason for this is that
the attempt to represent aggregate household demands as resulting from one \representative"
optimising household decision maker may generate demand functions incompatible with the
implications of models with multiple decision makers.
Indeed Browning and Chiappori [10] have shown that if the ecient collective model is true
the Slutsky substitution matrix will generally not be symmetric, but can be represented by a
matrix that is the sum of a symmetric matrix plus a matrix of a rank determined by the number
of household members. Both in the context of demand analysis and in labour supply there
has been a detailed examination of the theoretical and empirical implications of the ecient
collective model, as detailed below. However, there are good reasons to believe that eciency
may not hold, if anything because of the informational requirements and the resulting cost of
implementing eciency. Thus in this paper we consider the structure of household demands
under the assumption that these are the result of non-cooperative interaction between household
members. This allows us to relax the assumption of eciency made in the collective models as
well as the restrictive structure of the unitary model which models household behaviour as if
there was one individual deciding.
Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget constraint implies
strong testable restrictions on the properties of demand functions. Empirical applications to
data on households often reject these restrictions. In particular, such data frequently show a
failure of Slutsky symmetry - the restriction of symmetry on the matrix of compensated price
responses (see for example Deaton [19], Browning and Meghir [13], Banks, Blundell and Lewbel
[2] and Browning and Chiappori [10]).
From the theoretical point of view, the inadequacy of the single consumer model as a de-
scription of decision making for households with more than one member has also long been
recognised. Attempts to reconcile this model with the existence of several sets of individ-
ual preferences have been made for instance by Samuelson [30] and Becker [3], [4] but rely
upon restrictive assumptions about preferences or within-household decision mechanisms (see
Bergstrom [5], Cornes and Silva [17]).
A large body of recent research has investigated models accommodating alternative descrip-
tions of within-household decision-making processes. Eciency of household decisions holds in
a number of models of household behaviour which have been suggested: for instance in the
Nash bargaining models of Manser and Brown [26], McElroy and Horney [29] and McElroy
2[28], and in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene [9] and Bourguignon and Chiap-
pori [8]. However, it is not a property of noncooperative models such as those of Ulph [32], [33]
and Chen and Woolley [14].
An important advance is made by Browning and Chiappori [10], who show that under the
sole assumption of ecient within-household decision making, the counterpart to the Slutsky
matrix for demands from a k member household is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a
matrix of rank k   1. Chiappori and Ekeland [15] establish not only that eciency implies a
rank k   1 deviation but also that a rank k   1 deviation implies the existence of preferences
compatible with ecient behaviour. Chiappori and Ekeland [16] show that for these preferences
to be identied it is required to know which goods are private and which are public and that
it is sucient for identication to assume the existence of exclusive goods. Browning and
Chiappori [10] report tests on Canadian data which reject symmetry for couples, but not for
single individual households. The hypothesis that the departure from symmetry for the sample
of couples has rank 1, as implied by the assumption of eciency, is also not rejected.
These results not only ll a gap in our theoretical understanding of demand behaviour but
also open the prospect of reconciling demand theory and data on consumer behaviour. The
work of Browning and Chiappori [10] and Chiappori and Ekeland [15] is important in showing
that the assumption of eciency generates testable restrictions on household demand functions,
clearly distinguishing the collective model from both the unitary and the entirely unrestricted
case.
In this paper we explore the same question of the testable restrictions implied by an alter-
native structural assumption on within household interactions. The model considered is the
principal alternative to both the unitary and collective models, that of noncooperative demand
behaviour with voluntarily contributed public goods. This model warrants attention in its own
right as the only currently widely discussed alternative to fully ecient models of the sort de-
scribed above1. It is also interesting in so far as the equilibria in this model can be considered as
the fallback position in bargaining models as suggested, for example, in Woolley [35], Lundberg
and Pollak [25] and Chen and Woolley [14].
Models of voluntarily contributed public goods have relevance beyond analysis of household
demand. When they involve more than two players, these models can be used to represent a
variety of situations involving private contributions to public goods either in the national or
international context. What distinguishes what we have termed the \household Nash equilib-
rium model" from the general Nash equilibrium model is the small number of agents, which is
two in the case considered here.
In section 2 we lay out the general framework. The model has two types of equilibria,
1D'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira [18] provide an interesting recent attempt to parametrise cases
intermediate between fully cooperative and fully noncooperative within-household behaviour.
3depending upon whether partners do or do not contribute jointly to a common set of public
goods. In section 3, we consider the case in which there are jointly contributed public goods.
We show that equilibrium quantities vary with prices and household income in ways compatible
with the adding up and homogeneity properties of unitary demands and that negativity and
symmetry properties will generally be violated, as in the collective model. We derive the
counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a
symmetric matrix and another matrix whose rank generally exceeds the deviation to be expected
in a collective setting. Section 4 is devoted to the properties of demands in the case of no
jointly contributed public goods. Adding up holds, homogeneity may fail and the rank of the
departure from negativity and symmetry is shown to be similar in rank to that when public
goods are jointly contributed. Section 5 oers an example. Section 6 discusses how to make
use empirically of the result and how to combine it with previous results. In particular, we
establish the numbers of public and private goods required for the result to constitute a testable
restriction on behaviour. The results suggest that the properties of the Slutsky matrix provide
a basis for testing not only the Browning-Chiappori assumption of eciency but also other
models within the class of those based on individual optimisation. Section 7 concludes.
2 The general model
Consider a household with two individuals, A and B. The household spends on a set of m
private goods q 2 Rm
+ and n public goods Q 2 Rn
+. The quantities of private goods purchased
by the individuals are qA and qB with total household quantities q  qA+qB. The quantities of
public goods purchased by the household are Q with individual contributions QA and QB and
Q  QA + QB: Individuals have smooth preferences represented by utility functions uA(qA;Q)
and uB(qB;Q), increasing and dierentiable in all arguments, so that individual preferences
are dened over the sum of contributions to the public goods.2 The partners have incomes of
yA 2 R+ and yB 2 R+. Household income is denoted y  yA+yB. Prices of private and public
goods respectively are the vectors p 2 Rm
+ and P 2 Rn
+.
Each person decides on the purchases made from their income so as to maximise their utility






















B  0; q
B  0
where inequalities should be read where appropriate as applying to each element of the relevant
vector.
2A good is public in the context of the household if more than one household member cares about it.
4A household Nash equilibrium consists of a set of quantities (qA;qB;QA;QB) simultaneously
solving these two problems. The existence of at least one such equilibrium is established in
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene [12]. The equilibrium need not be unique, though Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian [6], [7], Fraser [20] and Lechene and Preston [24] provide sucient conditions,
essentially involving normality of both public and private goods, for uniqueness of certain sorts
of equilibria.
In any equilibrium, public goods can be divided into two types - those to which only one part-
ner contributes and those to which both do. We refer to the former as individually contributed
public goods, and denote the quantity vectors for such goods3 QA and QB, the respective prices
PA and PB and their dimensions nA and nB. Without loss of generality we assume nA  nB.
The latter type, on the other hand, are referred to as jointly contributed public goods, with
quantity vector denoted X, prices R and dimension nX. Individual contributions to these
public goods are denoted XA and XB.
Equilibria can be distinguished into those in which there are and are not jointly contributed
public goods. Those in which nX  1 are called, for reasons which will become apparent,
income pooling equilibria and those in which nX = 0 are called separate spheres equilibria.
It is useful to recognise that the problems can be rewritten to have partners eectively
choosing the levels of the public goods for the household, subject to the constraint that this level
is greater than or equal to the contribution of the other agent. Given that yA = y p0qB P 0QB;
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0Q  y   p
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A; Q  Q
A q
B  0:
3 Income pooling equilibria
3.1 Income pooling
In an income pooling equilibrium, the solution to each partner's problem coincides with that















QA  0; X  X
B; q
A  0
3Note that subscripts A and B are used to distinguish goods contributed exclusively by individuals A and
B whereas superscripts A and B distinguish contributions by individuals A and B (to any good).
4For general preferences, there can only be one jointly contributed public good X: We discuss this in section
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where fA(:), F A(:), fB(:), F B(:), GA(:), GA(:) are conditional Marshallian demand functions
corresponding to the two partners' preferences and together satisfying the usual demand prop-
erties.













Qj for i = A;B; with respect to income y, price vectors p and P
and individually contributed public goods quantities of the other partner Qj respectively.
Note that (1) to (4) dene 2m+nA +nB equilibrium equations in 2m+nA +nB quantities
(qA;QA;qB;QB) independently of (5) and (6). Substituting solutions to these equations into
(5) or (6) will give the set of income pooling equilibria. Furthermore the set of solutions
to these equations plainly depend only upon (y;p;P) and in particular do not depend upon
the distribution of income within the household. This well known \income pooling" result
is the source of the name given to such equilibria. This result is well known and has been
discussed by many authors. Warr [34] established income pooling for the case of a single
public good and Kemp [23] extended the claim to the case of multiple public goods, assuming
interior equilibrium. Kemp's proof is queried by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian [6] who oer an
alternative proof.
3.2 Jointly contributed public goods
Satisfaction of both (5) and(6) with multiple jointly contributed public goods at anything other
than isolated values of (y;p;P) clearly requires a certain coincidence in preferences over public
goods between the two partners. Browning, Chiappori and Lechene [12] demonstrate that
6generically nX  1 so that typically there will not exist more than a single jointly contributed
public good in equilibrium5. More precisely, given a suitable topology on preferences, there is
no open set in the space of the couple's preferences, incomes and prices on which nX > 1 in
equilibrium. This is not to say, however, that there are not subspaces of preferences within
which equilibria with nX > 1 can hold on an open set of values for (y;p;P). What is required
is that the partners' marginal rates of substitution between jointly contributed public goods
should coincide at all equilibrium quantities of the goods over such a set. That is possible,
for example, if preferences over jointly contributed public goods are separable and identical
for the two partners. It is, in fact, possible even without such separability if preferences over
those individually contributed goods from which there is not separability are also identical
between the partners since there exist equilibria with quantities of these goods also identical
in equilibrium6. Lechene and Preston [24] demonstrate the possibility of such cases. Of course,
these cases are not robust to small independent perturbations in the partners' preferences but
identity and separability of preferences over subsets of public goods may make sense in certain
cases - for example, if the subutility function reects an agreed technology for producing some
intermediate good or if, say, the goods in question relate to children and the subutility reects
an agreed welfare function for the children. We present results covering both the generic case
and the possibility that nX > 1.
3.3 Household demands
In what follows we assume uniqueness of the equilibrium and denote the mappings from (y;p;P)
to the unique individual equilibrium goods vectors by A(y;p;P), A(y;p;P), B(y;p;P),




5Throughout the paper we say that a property holds generically if the closure of the set of couples' preferences,
incomes and prices at which it fails to hold has empty interior. To make such a statement we require a topology
on smooth preferences such as the compact-open topology discussed in, say, Kannai [22] or Mas-Colell [27]
6Specically, interior equilibria with nX > 1 exist on an open set of values for (y;p;P) if private goods can
be partitioned, qi = (qi
0;qi
1); i = A;B, in such a way that individual preferences take the weakly separable form
ui(qi;Q) = i(qi
0;Qi;(qi
1;X)) i = A;B
for some i(:;:;:); i = A;B and some common subutility function (:;:). In such a case, marginal rates of
substitution between public goods in X are, for each partner, the same function of quantities qi
1 and X and there
exist equilibria with qA
1 = qB
1 so that these marginal rates of substitution coincide as required. Such preferences
obviously include, for instance, the cases both of common separability of public goods (qi = qi
0; X = Q) and of
identical preferences (qi = qi












denote the household private and public goods vectors. Note that quantities are uniquely deter-
mined as functions of the same economic determinants y, p and P as would be the case under
the \unitary" model where the household maximises a household utility function given the
household budget constraint. Distinguishing unitary and noncooperative household behaviour
therefore requires that we establish whether these equilibrium quantities have properties dissim-
ilar to demands in unitary households. Browning and Chiappori [10] provide such an analysis
for the collective model, and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene [11] examine the relationship
between collective and unitary models.
The properties of unitary demands are the standard Hurwicz-Uzawa [21] integrability re-
quirements of adding up (Engel and Cournot aggregation), homogeneity, negativity and sym-
metry. It is easy to establish that the household Nash equilibrium quantities satisfy adding-up
and homogeneity.
Negativity and symmetry are less simply dealt with. These are concerned in the case of
the unitary model with the properties of the Slutsky matrix, the matrix of price responses
at xed household utility. Since household utility is undened in a noncooperative setting,
no such matrix is dened but we can adopt the Browning and Chiappori [10] notion of the
\pseudo-Slutsky matrix". This in the current context is the matrix






composed in a comparable way from derivatives of the equilibrium household quantities with












This is what would be calculated as the Slutsky matrix if the household were treated as behav-
ing according to the unitary model. The properties of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix can then be
examined by relating its terms to the \true" compensated price eects on the functions fA(:);
fB(:); F A(:), F B(:), GA(:) and GB(:) which correspond to the individual utility functions as-
sumed to have given rise to the observed behaviour of the household.























+ hy = 0
3. (Pseudo-Slutsky matrix) 	 is the sum of a symmetric negative semidenite matrix and a
matrix of rank generically equal to and never more than n+min(1;m max(nA nB;1)).
Proof of Theorem 1.
See the Appendix.
In the general case where the number of private goods is at least two and two partners
contribute to roughly similar numbers of public goods then the rank of the departure from a
symmetric and negative semidenite pseudo-Slutsky matrix is therefore n + 1, one more than
the number of public goods7.
To reduce the rank of the departure further requires specic restrictions on preferences.
Partners' decisions in the equilibrium interact through individually contributed public goods
in two ways - rstly, through income eects consequent upon the eect of either individual's
spending on household resources eectively available to their partner and, secondly, through ef-
fects of individually contributed public good provision on the preference ordering of the partner
over remaining goods. We can cut o the latter eect by appropriate separability assumptions
and thereby reduce the rank of the departure.
Theorem 2 In an income pooling equilibrium, if each person's preferences over their con-
tributed goods are separable from the public goods individually contributed by the other or if
all public goods are jointly contributed then 	 is generically the sum of a symmetric negative
semidenite matrix and a matrix of rank no more than 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.
See the Appendix.
This departure from conventional demand properties is a much smaller number but still
one more than the same departure in the collective model8 (Browning and Chiappori [10]).
Intermediate cases corresponding to partial separability will give departures of intermediate
rank.
7Note that in the typical case in which max(nA  nB;1)  m 1 it is immaterial to the rank whether public
goods are jointly or individually contributed since, say, an increase in nX matched by a corresponding fall in
nA + nB leaves the rank of the departure unchanged.
8This is as observed in Lechene and Preston [24], who consider the case in which all public goods are jointly
contributed and whose results are substantially generalised by Theorem 1.
94 Separate spheres
4.1 Separate spheres
In separate spheres equilibrium, by contrast, there are no jointly contributed public goods,
nX = 0 and partners contribute to disjoint subsets of public goods. The term separate spheres
is taken from Lundberg and Pollak [25] who consider such a case as the threat point in a
household bargaining model. All goods are individually contributed and household spending
on each of the goods to which either partner contributes is eectively constrained by their own
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B  0:















and equilibrium demands depend on the distribution of income within the household.
4.2 Household demands
Assuming again uniqueness, we can write the quantities solving the system of equations (8) to
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Even to dene conventional derivatives of demand and the pseudo-Slutsky matrix in such a
setting presents a problem as these equilibrium demands are not functions of household income.
10However household demands can be written as functions of the two individual incomes which
together constitute the sole source of variation in household income. It therefore makes sense
to look at income responses by considering the rate of change of household demands relative to
the rate of change of household income in all directions of variation which hold prices constant
- that is to say to consider the set of all directional derivatives 9












for some real y. Likewise, when considering price responses, we consider the set of directional
derivatives in all directions of variation which hold y constant while varying prices:
~ H 
 
~ p ~ P




~ yA   ~ yB





for some p 2 Rm and P 2 Rn. We can then dene the set of pseudo-Slutsky matrices
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 
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y;p0;P 00
2 R1+m+n and summarise properties of household demand as follows.
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3. (Pseudo-Slutsky matrix) 	 is the sum of a symmetric negative semidenite matrix and a
matrix of rank generically equal to and never more than n+min(1;m max(nA nB;1))
for all  2 R1+m+n.
Proof of Theorem 3.





in the space of yA, yB, p and P,
in which a proportion y of the change in household income arises from change in yA. We dene the directional
derivative in the manner of, say, Apostol [1, p.344], noting that it makes no sense in this context to require
kvk = 1.
11See the Appendix.
Adding up holds for dierentiation in all directions but homogeneity only if the directions
are such that equal proportional increases in both household income and prices are associated
with increases of the same proportion in the individual incomes10.
The properties of pseudo-Slutsky matrices, whatever , depart from those of Slutsky matri-
ces for the unitary household in generically similar fashion to that in the income pooling case.
The rank of the departure from conventional demand properties is the same as in the income
pooling case - typically n+1, one more than the number of public goods. This result therefore
applies to any type of equilibrium, and it is therefore immaterial to the generic rank of the
departure not only how many public goods are jointly contributed but also whether any are
jointly contributed at all. As in the case of income pooling, one would expect this bound on
the rank to be generically attained.
Again separability restrictions on preferences will reduce the rank of the departure from
unitary properties.
Theorem 4 In a separate spheres equilibrium, if each person's preferences over their con-
tributed goods are separable from the public goods individually contributed by the other then 	
is generically the sum of a symmetric negative semidenite matrix and a matrix of rank no
more than 1 for all  2 R1+m+n.
Proof of Theorem 4.
See the Appendix.
This is now the same rank of departure as found in the collective model11.
Empirical work conducted under the assumption of unitary decision making on data gen-
erated by a separate spheres equilibrium would be misspecied in terms of the household
characteristics assumed to determine the outcome. At each level of household income y and
of other determinants p, P and so on there will be households choosing dierently because
they dier in the within-household distribution of income. The properties of estimated Slutsky
matrices would depend upon empirical techniques applied. One approach would be to condi-
tion on enough additional characteristics12 in the hope that the division of income within the
household could then eectively be treated as a deterministic function of household income and
prices. If successful, this approach would give a pseudo-Slutsky matrix of the form 	 with the
10Equivalently, the elements of  are equal to the derivatives of a linearly homogeneous function from R1+m+n
to R taking the value yA.
11The fact that the rank reduction in this case is greater than under income pooling arises because, with no
public goods being jointly contributed, this separability restriction is more demanding.
12These would be similar to the `distribution factors' of Browning and Chiappori [10].
12elements of  corresponding to partial derivatives of that function with respect to y, p and P.
Alternatively, estimation which, say, picked up household demands at the conditional median
within-household distribution of income would give rise to pseudo-Slutsky matrices of the form
	 with the elements of  corresponding to median directions of variation in relevant variables.
Estimation, on the other hand, which picked out, say, the conditional mean household demand
would give a pseudo-Slutsky matrix which would be the mean of matrices of the form 	 and
which would therefore typically not have the properties noted in Theorem 3.
5 An example
Consider the following example in illustration of the results derived above. There are m private
















i and bJ is an m vector allowing nonseparability of private from public good
demand.




































































J J = A; B:
Adding up and homogeneity are easily seen to hold.

























































































































i =pi if i = j
















































The deviation from symmetry, 	   	A   	B, has rank 2 as suggested by Theorem 1.
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Again the departure from symmetry, 	 	A 	B, is rank 2, in accordance with Theorem 3.
If bB = 0 then each person's preferences over those goods which they contribute are separable
from the public goods contributed by the other person, ~ B = 0 and the rank of the deviation
falls to rank 1 in accordance with Theorem 4.
6 Empirical testing
Theorems 1 and 3 establish a common bound for the rank of the departure of pseudo-Slutsky
matrices from symmetric and negative semidenite matrices in the household Nash equilibrium
with voluntary contributed public goods. The bound, which is generically reached, is n + 1
15(unless nA   nB is known and large relative to m). This section assesses the usefulness of this
bound for testing either cooperative or noncooperative behaviour.
Note rstly that, unless there are no public goods (n = 0); in which case noncooperative
behaviour is ecient, then the departure under Nash equilibrium is greater than the rank 1
departure found under the collective model. Browning and Chiappori [10] discuss how to test a
rank 1 departure by testing the rank of 	 	0. If such tests fail to reject a rank 1 departure for
couples then the results above establish clearly that cooperative behaviour cannot be rejected
against noncooperative behaviour for any number of public goods.
What, however, if cooperative behaviour is rejected? Is it possible to use properties of the
pseudo-Slutsky matrix to test compatibility with noncooperative behaviour of the sort analysed
here? The rst point to note in this respect is that the nature of the departure depends upon the
number of public goods. This makes sense. In the cooperative case the rank of the departure
is 1 because all interaction arises through the single dimension of the sharing rule. In the
noncooperative case interaction arises through the public goods and it is natural that the rank
of the departure should depend upon how many public goods there are. There is an important
implication of this. Either one knows how many goods are publicly consumed in the household
or one can only test noncooperative behaviour jointly with a hypothesis about the number of
public goods13.
The restrictiveness of the above results regarding the properties of pseudo-Slutsky matrices
also depends upon not having too many public goods.
Theorem 5 Let 	 be either the pseudo-Slutsky matrix in an income pooling equilibrium or a
pseudo-Slutsky matrix corresponding to directions of dierentiation in which homogeneity holds
in a separate spheres equilibrium. Then the restriction that 	 deviate from symmetry by a
matrix of rank no more than n + 1 is restrictive if and only if m  n + 5.
Proof of Theorem 5.
See the Appendix.
For example, to test for noncooperative behaviour with one public good requires at least 7
goods in total of which 6 are private.
13The private or public quality of a good is intrinsically linked with the form of preferences and not the nature
of the goods, being a matter of which goods enter the preferences of which individuals. Under the assumption
of egoistic preferences, this could be established if it were possible to test the excludability and rivalrousness of
those goods.
167 Conclusion
In this paper, we establish properties of demands in the Nash equilibrium with two agents
and voluntarily contributed public goods. This noncooperative model is the polar case to the
cooperative model of Browning and Chiappori [10] within the class of those models based on
individual optimisation.
We show that the nature of the departure from unitary demand properties in household Nash
equilibrium is qualitatively similar to that in collectively ecient models in that negativity and
symmetry of compensated price responses is not guaranteed. The counterpart to the Slutsky
matrix can be shown to depart from negativity and symmetry by a matrix whose rank typically
exceeds that found in the collective model unless strong auxiliary restrictions are placed on
preferences. This constitutes a testable restriction on household demand functions provided
the number of private goods is large enough relative to the number of public goods. Future
work will explore sucient conditions for consistency with noncooperative equilibrium within
the household.
17Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
1. Engel aggregation and Cournot aggregation follow by dierentiating the household bud-
get constraint p0(y;p;P) + P 0(y;p;P) = y. .
2. Equilibrium quantities satisfying (1) to (6) will satisfy homogeneity given homogeneity of
the individual demand functions.
3. Substituting the equilibrium functions into (1) to (6) and dierentiating, equilibrium






















where the matrices M, N1 and N2 are dened below.
The M matrix captures interactions between the goods purchases of the two household




































































 D1 + D2:
The components A1, B1, C1 and D1 arise from interaction through the budget constraint,
as greater purchases of any good individually contributed by one partner decreases the
amount left over from the household budget for purchases by the other. These matrices
each have rank 1, being each the outer product of a vector of income derivatives and a
vector of prices.
The components A2, B2, C2 and D2 arise from the eect of one individual's purchases
of individually contributed public goods on the preference ordering of the other over
the goods individually contributed by the other. Such terms are generically of rank nB,
min(m + nB;nA), min(nX;nB) and min(nX;nA), respectively15.
14We note the dimension of identity and zero submatrices only where it is not obvious from conformability
or from the dimensions of adjacent submatrices.
15Each has only nB, nA, nB and nA non zero columns, respectively, corresponding to the number of public
goods individually contributed by the other but in the case of B2, C2 and D2 this determines the rank only if
the numbers of rows m + nB, nX and nX, respectively, are not short of nA.
18Taking these observations together, we see that the matrices A, B, C and D are therefore
generically of rank 1 + nB, min(m + nB;1 + nA), min(nX;1 + nB) and min(nX;1 + nA),
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and are composed of conventional income and price eects, excepting that it is necessary
to recognise in N2 that increases in the prices of the public goods individually contributed
by one partner decrease the amount left over from the household budget for purchases by
the other.
The system (13) is overdetermined, specically in the nal 2nX lines which imply alterna-
tive expressions for dX. With nX = 1 compatibility is ensured by adding up, whereas for
nX > 1 similar issues arise to those discussed in Section 3.2 concerning the nongenericity
of such cases. If we let  M,  N1 and  N2 denote the submatrices of M, N1 and N2 obtained

































A = E M
 1
0














Im 0 Im 0
0 InA 0 0
0 0 0 InB+nX
!
is an appropriate aggregating matrix.
The pseudo-Slutsky matrix now follows from:
	 = E M
 1
0



























p + F A
y qA0 F A
PA + F A
y Q0
A 0 F A











p + F B
y qB0 0 F B
PB + F B
y Q0
B F B







































C C C C
A
:
Note that the terms in  are all elements of the underlying symmetric and negative















































I + AB(I   AB) 1  A(I   BA) 1 0
 B(I   AB) 1 I + BA(I   BA) 1 0



































































The individual Slutsky matrices 	A and 	B are symmetric and negative semidenite and
so therefore is their sum. The deviation from conventional demand properties is therefore
determined by the properties of 1 + 2 + .
20The rank of 1 cannot exceed the rank of B which is at most min(1 + nA;m + nB) and
that of 2 cannot exceed the rank of A which is at most 1 + nB, each being dened as
products involving these matrices.
The rank of  cannot exceed nX since it contains only nX non-zero rows. However the












































































































































































































by standard properties of the Slutsky matrix. Therefore the rank of X cannot exceed
nX   1 and neither therefore can that of .
The rank of 1 + 2 +  cannot be greater than the sum of their ranks considered
individually which is n+min(1;m nA+nB). This number cannot exceed the dimension
21n + m of the (square) matrix 	 but can equal it in the one case m = 1 and nA = nB.
In this case it becomes relevant that 1, 2 and  share a common linear dependency










































































This means that their sum cannot be of full rank and the maximum rank is reduced by 1
in this instance. (This is simply a consequence of Engel and Cournot aggregation which
ensure 	 must be singular as are 	A and 	B.)
The rank of the departure is therefore bounded from above by n+min(1;m max(nA  
nB;1)).
Although the theorem establishes only a bound on the rank of the sum of the matrices
1+2+, inspection of the form of the matrices suggests that this bound will generically
be attained. Generically, only a single public good is jointly contributed in income pooling
equilibria in which case  disappears. The matrices 1 and 2 are both matrix products
in which the factors of lowest rank are B and A respectively and therefore the rank of
their sum will generically be the sum of the ranks of A and B.
Proof of Theorem 2.
If preferences of each partner over their individually contributed goods are separable from the
public goods individually contributed by the other or if there are no individually contributed
public goods then A2 and B2 disappear, A and B reduce to rank 1 matrices and therefore in the
generic case of nX = 1 the rank of the departure falls to 2.
Proof of Theorem 3.










and therefore  p
P










from which Engel and Cournot aggregation follow for any .










for any  > 0. Therefore

~ p ~ P

























P ~ yA   ~ yB
























which is true only if yy + p0p + P 0P = yA.
3. As in the income pooling case, we substitute the equilibrium functions into (8) to (11)
























where the matrices M, N A
1 , N B
1 and N2 are dened below.
The M matrix captures interactions between the goods purchases of the two household






















and capture only the eects of individually contributed public goods purchases on part-
ners' preference orderings over their individually contributed goods. A and B are generi-
cally of rank nB and min(nA;m + nB), respectively.
The N A
1 , N B














































23and are composed of conventional income and price eects.
Dening a suitable aggregating matrix
E 
 
Im 0 Im 0
0 InA 0 0
0 0 0 InB
!





































































































while A, B and  are vectors.




I + AB(I   AB) 1  A(I   BA) 1




































































The individual Slutsky matrices 	A and 	B are symmetric and negative semidenite and
so therefore is their sum. The deviation from conventional demand properties is therefore
determined by the properties of 1 + 2 + K.
The rank of 1 cannot exceed the rank of B which is at most min(nA;m + nB) and that
of 2 cannot exceed the rank of A which is at most nB, each being dened as products
involving these matrices. Moreover, K being a matrix product involving an outer product
of vectors16, has rank 1.
The rank of 1 +2 +K cannot be greater than the sum of the ranks of the component
matrices considered individually which is n + min(1;m   nA + nB). This number cannot
exceed the dimension n + m of the (square) matrix 	 but can equal it in the one case
m = 1 and nA = nB. In this case it becomes relevant that 1, 2 and K all share a







































































































= 1   1 = 0:
Thus the maximum rank is reduced by 1 in this instance and the rank of the departure
is therefore bounded from above by n + min(1;m   max(nA   nB;1)).
The rank of K is always 1. The matrices 1 and 2, as in the income pooling case, are
both matrix products and their sum will generically have rank equal to the sum of the
ranks of A and B.
Proof of Theorem 4.
If preferences of each partner over their individually contributed goods are separable from the
public goods individually contributed by the other then A and B disappear and therefore the
rank of the departure falls to 1.
Lemma 1 Let 	 be a real k k matrix such that the rank of 	 	0 cannot exceed s. Then 	
can be written as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank at most r if and only if
either (i) 2r + 1  s or (ii) 2r + 1 < s and 	   	0 has rank at most 2r.
16By adding up, it is impossible for either N A
1 or N B
1 to be zero vectors or for them to equal each other so
these matrices have rank of exactly 1.
25Proof of Lemma 1.
For any real kk matrix 	 the matrix 	 	0 is skew symmetric and therefore has even rank.
If the rank of 	   	0 cannot exceed s then its rank is therefore at most s if s is even and at
most s   1 if s is odd.
Suppose 	 can be written as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank at most
r. Then
















which has rank at most 2r. If s is even then the rank is therefore at most min(2r;s) whereas
if s is odd then the rank is therefore at most min(2r;s   1). In each case the bound of 2r is
restrictive only if 2r + 1 < s.
Conversely, suppose 	   	0 has rank at most 2r. (Note that this holds for any matrix 	 if
the rank of 	  	0 cannot exceed s and 2r +1  s.) Since 	 	0 is real and skew symmetric,
it is possible (see, for example, Theorem 2.5 in Thompson [31]) to write 	   	0 = ULU0 for














i = 	0  
Pr
i=1 iviu0
i is symmetric. Call this matrix S. Then 	 can be
written as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank at most r






This result generalises Lemma 1 of Browning and Chiappori [10] to cover departures of any
rank.
Proof of Theorem 5.













(	   	0) = 0 and the rank of 	   	0 cannot exceed one less than its
dimension n + m.
Lemma 1 shows that if 	   	0 is known to have rank at most n + m   1 then it is possible
to write 	 as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank at most r whenever 2r+1 
n + m   1. A departure from symmetry of rank at most n + 1 is therefore restrictive only
if 2n + 3 < n + m   1. It must therefore be the case that m  n + 5 in order to test for
noncooperative behaviour with n public goods.
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